# The Focal Point



# Our expectation for the next year

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# Summary

- Inward-focused, deficit-funded policies may help the US maintain above-trend GDP growth in the coming year but could come at the expense of other economies, as geopolitical shifts and tariff threats heighten uncertainties.
- A muted commodity market rally and a sluggish domestic business sector may continue to dampen demand and economic sentiment. Combined with high interest rates, these factors are likely to constrain loan demand.
- While FDIs have insofar does little to improve Indonesia's strategic positions in the global supply chain, securing a trade deal with the US may open opportunities in more promising sectors.
- The global economy is expected to maintain its robust growth as the end of the year draws near, with the IMF forecasting a 3.2% GDP growth for FY 2024. However, mounting political and economic turmoil has, for many, overshadowed what is technically (in growth terms) a strong year. Governmental changes happened across the globe, whether through elections or other means, as recently unfolded in Syria. At the same time, two of Europe's economic giants are grappling with domestic government crises, further fuelling the year's pervasive theme of uncertainties.
- Meanwhile, the USD continue to reign supreme over other currencies (the DXY index recorded a 4.65% YTD growth), a symptom of investors dialling down their risk appetite amidst the highly volatile period. Coupled with the series of monetary and fiscal stimulus thrown into the Chinese economy, this underscores the challenges for financial markets in Indonesia and Asia. Foreign investors have cut exposure to Indonesia's stock market by around USD 1.75 billion since the start of Q4-2024, while the Rupiah continued to hover between 15,670— 15,850/USD in the past couple of months.

# Global: Embracing the reality of American exceptionalism

The global trend of "strong economic data but weak vibes" may resolve in the coming year, though likely in select economies. Presidentelect Trump's plans for corporate tax cuts and deregulation are expected to bolster U.S. investments, driving growth in fixed-asset investments, particularly private non-residential investments (up 3.99% YoY in Q3-

- 2024). Additionally, the extended personal income tax break and a resilient labour market are likely to sustain US consumers' purchasing power, while the strengthening USD helps mitigate the impact of tariffs on prices.
- The U.S. economy is expected to maintain its above-average GDP growth trend, with an average growth of 2.7% SAAR since 2022, compared to the pre-pandemic average of 1.9% SAAR. Alas, persistently robust growth will likely mean persistent inflationary pressures in the US. For instance, more stringent immigration policies are expected to tighten the already tight US labour market, keeping the services component of inflation

high. The returning inflationary pressure may compel the Fed to neither go far nor fast when executing its rate cut campaign in 2025, indicating that the current atmosphere of high UST yield and expensive USD

may persist in the new year (see Chart 1).

■ The seemingly returning spectre of US inflation is not the only factor that may keep the UST yield at a relatively high level. More robust US growth trends and the tight labour market in the past couple of years have shifted the neutral interest rate (the so-called R-star) to around 1.2%, compared to around 0.8% between 2009 and 2019 (per the estimates from the New York Fed). The term premium on UST securities has also been rising lately, as the US Treasury Department is expected to issue more long-term bonds following the

- experiment with activist treasury issuance in the past couple of years.
- Meanwhile, the conditions outside of the US continue to be mired in uncertainties. Apart from the pressure due to the higher-for-longer UST yield and expensive USD, President Trump's unorthodox approach to geopolitics also highlights the challenge facing economic policymakers outside of the US. His repeated criticisms of NATO may pressure other member countries to meet the 2% defence spending commitment, potentially diverting public funds from other expenditures such as social spending—key to Western Europe's social-democratic systems. The primary

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concern remains tariffs, as Trump has reaffirmed his commitment to impose broad and high tariffs on US imports, differing from the tiered approach proposed by figures like Treasury nominee Bessent.

While it is also a serious topic in Europe, nowhere that the tariff question more central to the economy than in China. The country remains dependent on the US and global demand to absorb its massive surplus of manufacturing goods, given the Chinese authorities' continued unwillingness to use fiscal stimulus to directly re-energise their domestic aggregate demand condition. The uncertain demand outlook from the US import market may narrow the room for Chinese manufacturers to further expand, keeping the demand for industrial raw materials relatively muted (see Chart 2).

### Indonesia: Things are (not) gonna get easier

- The less optimistic outlook for global demand for minerals and industrial raw materials signals another challenging period for the Indonesian economy. Our observations of the domestic corporate sector show a positive correlation between corporate revenues and commodity prices (even in sectors unrelated to the commodity-producing sector), suggesting a continued period of slow recovery in the outlook for corporate revenue in the coming months.
- A prolonged period of below-trend corporate revenue growth would have wider implications for the domestic economy. The corporate sector often bases its strategies, including on capital expenditures, on revenue trends, with

CAPEX realisation typically lagging revenue growth. By extension, lower CAPEX realisation, a consequence of the sluggish revenue growth, may suppress the demand for labour in the corporate sector. This

limited improvement in the labour market condition may further dampen consumer sentiment, creating a feedback loop that further influences businesses' perceptions of domestic market conditions.

Recent developments in the financial sector seem to strengthen the argument for the companies and the wider business sector's low expectations for the Indonesian economy in the upcoming periods. Businesses appear to be throwing fewer calls to banks and the broader financial sector in 2024 (see Chart 3), reflecting reduced demand (or urgency) to raise money investments spend on or other expenditures. Below-trend revenue growth, of

- course, has also left many businesses unable to self-finance such projects. Persistently high interest rates may continue to discourage borrowing, signalling lower private investment across most sectors, except for a few that have continued to attract investors' interest.
- Alas, where investors seem to gather in the domestic manufacturing and the wider business sector does not seem to help much in improving Indonesia's strategic position in the global supply chain. Foreign investments, mostly from China, are instrumental in moving mineral-producing Indonesia's sector downstream, while the production of final goods appears to be declining amidst the lack of investments (see Chart 4). Indeed, Indonesia

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been successful has market) has put domestic


manufacturers of finished goods in a quandary. What this means, then, is that the Indonesian manufacturing sector has in practice moved upstream of the tariff-hit China's supply chain despite the down-streaming agenda, domestic potentially exposing the manufacturing sector to greater volatilities following the logic of the bullwhip effect.


The new year, then, may not be too kind for the Indonesian economy. The still-high UST yield means that Bank Indonesia may continue to put currency stabilisation over growth, despite the slowing demand for credit amid the weakening businesses and consumers' sentiment. The high interest rate burden also


cementing itself as the primary supplier of China's industrial inputs, while the influx of cheap imported goods (as Chinese manufacturers are losing their access to the US

means that the government may need to maintain its primary balance at a surplus, limiting its ability to use fiscal policies to boost domestic consumption. The question mark on the demand for China-made goods, of course, will also add to the poly-challenges now facing the Indonesian economy.

Indonesia, of course, is not doomed despite the apparent gloom. Securing a bilateral trade deal with the US will be a game-changer, potentially spurring FDIs in other exportoriented sectors beyond the commodity-related ones. The newly launched Danantara may also enable the government to maintain its role in spurring investments, although it remains to be seen how the SWF will perform. Ergo, it is safe to say that Indonesia is on a more promising path than many other countries, although the poly-challenges mean that a below 5% GDP growth is, at this moment, more likely than not to transpire in the upcoming year.








# As downstream, so upstream

Indonesia have succeeded to move down-stream its commodity-producing sector at the cost of other sectors, potentially exposing the economy to more global demand shocks.



Economic Calendar							
		Actual	Previous	Forecast*			
02 December 2024							
ID	S&P Global Manufacturing PMI	49.6	49.2	49.6			
ID	Inflation Rate YoY, %	1.55	1.71	1.6			
US	S&P Global Manufacturing PMI	49.7	48.5	48.8			
05 Decei	mber 2024						
US	Balance of Trade, USD Bn	-73.8	-83.8	-83			
06 Decer	mber 2024						
ID	Foreign Exchange Reserves, USD Bn	150.2	151.2	152.0			
US	Non-Farm Payrolls, th	227	36	194.0			
08 December 2024							
ID	Motorbike Sales YoY, %	-10.3	5.4	-			
09 Decer	mber 2024						
CN	Inflation Rate YoY, %	0.2	0.3	0.5			
ID	Consumer Confidence	125.9	121.1	121			
10 Decer	mber 2024						
ID	Retail Sales YoY, %		4.8	4.5			
CN	Balance of Trade, USD Bn		95.27	89.0			
11 Decer	mber 2024						
US	Inflation Rate YoY, %		2.6	2.7			
16 Decer	mber 2024						
CN	Retail Sales YoY, %		4.8	4.5			
ID	Balance of Trade, USD Bn		2.47	-			
17 December 2024							
EU	Balance of Trade, USD Bn		12.5	-			
US	Retail Sales YoY, %		2.8	-			
18 Deser	mber 2024						
ID	Loan Growth YoY, %		10.92	-			
ID	Interest Rate Decision, %		6.0	-			
EU	Inflation Rate YoY, %		2.0	2.3			
19 Deser	mber 2024						
US	Fed Interest Rate Decision, %		4.75	4.5			
20 Decer	mber 2024						
US	PCE Price Index YoY, %		2.3	-			
ID	Car Sales YoY, %		-3.9	-			
	mber 2024						
ID	M2 Money Supply YoY, %		6.7	-			

<sup>\*</sup>Forecasts of some indicators are simply based on market consensus Bold indicates indicators covered by the BCA Monthly Economic Briefing report

# **Selected Macroeconomic Indicator**

Key Policy Rates	Rate (%)	Last Change	Real Rate (%)	Trade & Commodities	6-Dec	-1 mth	Chg (%)	
US	4.75	Nov-24	2.15	Baltic Dry Index	1,167.0	1,405.0	-16.9	
UK	4.75	Nov-24	2.45	S&P GSCI Index	531.5	545.5	-2.6	
EU	3.40	Oct-24	1.10	Oil (Brent, \$/brl)	71.1	75.5	-5.8	
Japan	0.25	Jul-24	-2.40	Coal (\$/MT)	132.4	144.8	-8.5	
China (lending)	2.00	Sep-24	4.15	Gas (\$/MMBtu)	2.84	1.72	64.7	
Korea	3.00	Oct-24	1.50	Gold (\$/oz.)	2,633.4	2,744.0	-4.0	
India	6.50	Feb-23	0.29	Copper (\$/MT)	9,011.9	9,598.0	-6.1	
Indonesia	6.00	Sep-24	4.45	Nickel (\$/MT)	15,824.5	15,864.9	-0.3	
Money Mkt Rates	6-Dec	-1 mth	Chg	CPO (\$/MT)	1,207.3	1,142.6	5.7	
Money Mkt Kates	о-рес	-1 111(11	(bps)	Rubber (\$/kg)	2.12	2.00	6.0	
SPN (1Y)	6.74	6.69	5.2	External Sector	Oct	Sep	Chg (%)	
SUN (10Y)	6.90	6.72	17.8	LXternal Sector				
INDONIA (O/N, Rp)	5.97	6.12	-14.9	Export (\$ bn)	24.41	22.06	10.69	
JIBOR 1M (Rp)	6.63	6.63	-0.4	Import (\$ bn)	21.94	18.82	16.54	
Bank Rates (Rp)	Sep	Aug	Chg (bps)	Trade bal. (\$ bn) Central bank reserves	2.48	3.23	-23.39	
Lending (WC)	8.87	8.78	8.91	(\$ bn)*	151.2	149.9	0.87	
Deposit 1M	4.81	4.79	2.01					
Savings	0.67	0.65	1.33	Prompt Indicators	Nov	Oct	Sep	
Currency/USD	6-Dec	-1 mth	Chg (%)	Consumer confidence index (CCI)	125.9	121.1	123.5	
UK Pound	0.785	0.767	-2.28	Car sales (%YoY)	-11.9	-3.9	-9.1	
Euro	0.946	0.915	-3.31					
Japanese Yen	150.0	151.6	1.08	Motorcycle sales	-10.3	5.4	3.7	
Chinese RMB	7.272	7.105	-2.30	(%YoY)	10.5	511	J.,	
Indonesia Rupiah	15,850	15,735	-0.73				Chg (bps)	
Capital Mkt	6-Dec	-1 mth	Chg (%)	Manufacturing PMI	Nov	Oct		
JCI	7,382.8	7,491.9	-1.46	USA	49.7	48.5	120	
DJIA	44,642.5	42,221.9	5.73	Eurozone	45.2	46.0	-80	
FTSE	8,308.6	8,172.4	1.67	Japan	49.0	49.2	-20	
Nikkei 225	39,091.2	38,474.9	1.60	China	51.5	50.3	120	
Hang Seng	19,865.9	21,007.0	-5.43	Korea	50.6	48.3	230	
Foreign portfolio ownership (Rp Tn)	Nov	Oct	Chg (Rp Tn)	Indonesia	49.6	49.2	40	
Stock	3,402.4	3,573.9	-171.49					
Govt. Bond	872.5	885.6	-13.07					
Corp. Bond	7.1	6.9	0.23					

Source: Bloomberg, BI, BPS

Notes:

Car and motorcycle sales data to be released on the third week of January 2022

<sup>^</sup>Data for January 2022

<sup>\*</sup>Data from an earlier period

<sup>\*\*</sup>For changes in currency: **Black** indicates appreciation against USD, **Red** otherwise

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>For PMI, >50 indicates economic expansion, <50 otherwise

# **Indonesia - Economic Indicators Projection**

	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024E	2025E
Gross Domestic Product (% YoY)	-2.1	3.7	5.3	5.0	5.0	4.9
GDP per Capita (US\$)	3912	4350	4784	4920	4945	4980
Consumer Price Index Inflation (% YoY)	1.7	1.9	5.5	2.6	1.9	2.5
BI 7-day Repo Rate (%)	3.75	3.50	5.50	6.00	5.75	5.00
USD/IDR Exchange Rate (end of the year)**	14,050	14,262	15,568	15,397	15,947	16,393
Trade Balance (US\$ billion)	21.7	35.3	54.5	37.0	29.3	26.2
Current Account Balance (% GDP)	-0.4	0.3	1.0	-0.1	-0.7	-0.9

<sup>\*</sup>Estimated number

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<sup>\*\*</sup> Estimation of the Rupiah's fundamental exchange rate