# The Focal Point



# Making do with less

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#### **Summary**

- The domestic consumption trend has shown some slight improvement, driven by lower food prices despite the still-uncertain outlook for disposable income.
- However, the improvement in consumption trends among uppermiddle-income households appears to be more limited, as better-off households still face relatively high food prices, while the government focuses its support on the lower segment of the household sector.
- Rather than a quick burst of rate cuts, a stronger Rupiah may be more effective in maintaining the purchasing power of upper-middleincome households.
- The market seems to have had no reason to complain in the past week. All doves are breaking loose in many central bank meetings, as the Fed projected another 50 bps rate cuts in 2024, while BoJ governor Ueda signalled no rush in resuming Japan's rate normalisation campaign. Although the PBoC initially surprised the market by holding its benchmark lending rate (the loan prime rate), its recent move to cut the 14-day reverse repo rate to 1.85% reinforces the broader theme of easing monetary conditions worldwide, signifying the Fall of falling rates that we now find ourselves in.
- This rate-cut bonanza also reached the Indonesian financial market. Bank Indonesia began cutting its policy rate in Q3-2024, defying its earlier guidance and most analysts' expectations. This pleasant surprise reinvigorated foreign investors' interest in the Indonesian market, resulting in a surge of

- foreign inflows despite the short trading week. The Rupiah, of course, is not behind in the rally, as the currency is now up 1.60% YTD against the USD from its previous trough of -6.84%.
- While we continue to believe that peak rate cut expectations have driven the Rupiah to trade above its fair value, we must also acknowledge BI's role in stabilising the currency. The SRBI instrument has defined what success means as a liquidity absorption tool, while the central bank's macroprudential policy mix and various liquidity incentives have helped sustain robust bank loan growth. The much-strengthened Rupiah now allows the central bank to shift its focus from currency stability to the domestic growth outlook, which increasingly appears to be in a less-than-ideal condition, as indicated by the deflationary trend (in MoM terms) over the past four months.

#### Some support is better than none

- Bank Indonesia have faced numerous setbacks and hiccups in its effort to stabilise the Rupiah during its depreciatory trend between March and July 2024. Fortunately, the central bank may have some head start in its ongoing quest to turn the domestic growth outlook around. BI's real sales index (RSI) data shows a considerable pick-up in the past five months (5.8% YoY in August 2024, -2.7% YoY in April 2024), while our internal big data also shows that the consumer transaction growth has been trending slightly northwards in the past month (see Chart 1).
- Private consumption, we should note, is the
  - largest gear in the machine driving the Indonesian economy forward and the central bank's primary channel in which the central bank could utilise its monetary instruments influence economic growth momentum.

However, any arguments linking the recent pick-up in the consumption data to anticipation of BI's rate-cut campaign seem to be too premature, as other factors could be seen as the main drivers behind the recent (albeit still limited) recovery in the domestic aggregate demand condition.

What drives the recent recovery in private consumption, it seems, is the same factor prompting some analysts to advocate for a BI rate cut in the September 2024 meeting: falling inflationary pressures (see Chart 2). The food, beverages, and tobacco component recorded the highest yearly growth in BI's retail sales survey for August 2024, with a 7.7% YoY increase compared to 6.5% YoY previously.

- While the consumption trend appears to be improving, it should be noted that the overall private demand condition is still some measures away from its ideal shape. Indeed, households in the upper-middle-income segment may not expect a significant improvement in their disposable income, and the situation is even more challenging for those in the worse-off segment, given the increasingly limited employment conditions.
- Fortunately, the government's expanding fiscal posture could be expected to provide some relief for households in the lowerincome segment. For instance, the reported

"Further improvement in

the demand condition

remains uncertain, given

the limited outlook for

disposable income"

19.0% MoM spike in grain imports in August demonstrates food

acceleration of the government's social spending realisation could also be expected to provide some relief to worse-off households, allowing them to maintain their consumption basket despite the overall challenging conditions.


The government, of course, cannot be expected to provide the same level of support for better-off households. This situation is particularly true for food prices, as prices in the traditional market (which mostly cater to worse-off households) seem to have fallen more significantly compared to prices in modern markets (which cater to more affluent households). What results, then, is more affluent households facing a rising food price

2024 the government's commit-ment to keep the domestic food supply and prices stable, protecting economic groups more sensitive to a swing in The prices.

- premium compared to their lower-income counterparts (see Chart 3), further limiting the improvement in their consumption basket.
- BI's decision to expedite its rate-cut timeline may help bridge the gap between the middleupper-income households' lagging consumption growth and that of their lower-income counterparts. However, we remain sceptical that this effect will materialise in the short term. Monetary policy, after all, is transmitted through long and variable lags (especially given the low households' exposure to banking products), and the still-robust growth in productive loans may also limit banks' capacity to distribute more consumptive loans. Hence, as we have argued before, the impact of BI's recent rate cut action seems to be limited to the financial market, while households in the middle-upper-income segment continue to face challenges to maintain their consumption basket.
- However, this does not mean that BI has no role in supporting domestic consumption in the short term. The ongoing industrial consolidation has led to a slower inventory build-up of manufactured goods in China, making Chinese manufacturers less inclined to

- sell at discounted prices. This, in turn, could push imported prices higher in Indonesia and other importing countries (see Chart 4). A stronger Rupiah, of course, would help to neutralise this effect, keeping imported goods affordable for households and allowing them to maintain their consumption basket despite limited improvements in disposable income.
- Therefore, rather than quickly following up on the 25-bps rate cut from the previous meeting, efforts to boost domestic consumption in the short term may require BI to share the responsibility with the government. Government spending remains crucial for stabilizing domestic prices and supporting lower-income households' purchasing power, while BI continues to focus on stabilising the Rupiah and, consequently, the prices of imported goods.

"Despite its threat to the manufacturing sector, allowing cheap imported goods remains crucial to support the domestic aggregate demand condition"







Chart 3

Chart 4


## Modern costs more

The declining food prices seem to benefit lower-middle-income consumers more than households in the middle-upper-income segment.



# Haggling for prices

A stronger Rupiah may keep imported goods affordable as Chinese manufacturers seem less willing to offer discounts amid the ongoing industrial consolidation.



Economic Calendar								
		Actual	Previous	Forecast*				
02 September 2024								
ID	CPI Inflation YoY, %	2.12	2.13	2.30				
ID	S&P Global Manufacturing PMI	48.9	49.3	49				
03 Septe	03 September 2024							
US	S&P Global Manufacturing PMI	47.9	49.6	4.8				
04 September 2024								
US	Balance Of Trade, Bn	-78.8	-73	-78.5				
US	Redbook YoY (%)	6.3	5	-				
05 September 2024								
EU	Retail Sales YoY, %	-0.1	-0.4	-0.1				
06 Septe	ember 2024							
ID	Foreign Exchange Reserves, USD Bn	150.2	145.4	-				
US	Non Farm Payrolls, K	142	89	120				
09 September 2024								
CN	Inflation Rate YoY, %	0.6	0.5	0.5				
ID	Motorbike Sales YoY, %	7.4	26	-				
ID	Car Sales YoY, %	-14.2	-7.8	-				
10 Septe	ember 2024							
ID	Retail Sales YoY, %	4.5	2.7	3.0				
11 Septe	ember 2024							
US	Inflation Rate YoY, %	2.5	2.9	2.7				
14 Septe	ember 2024							
CN	Retail Sales YoY, %	2.1	2.7	2.5				
17 Septe	ember 2024							
ID	Balance of Trade, USD Bn	2.89	0.50	1.3				
18 Septe	ember 2024							
ID	Interest Rate Decision, %	6.0	6.25	6.25				
19 Septe	ember 2024							
US	Fed Interest Rate Decision, %	5	5.5	5.25				
23 Septe	ember 2024							
ID	M2 Money Supply YoY, %	7.3	7.6					
24 Septe	ember 2024							
US	S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price YoY, %		6.5	5.9				
27 Septe	ember 2024							
US	PCE Price Index YoY, %		2.5	2.3				

<sup>\*</sup>Forecasts of some indicators are simply based on market consensus Bold indicates indicators covered by the BCA Monthly Economic Briefing report

# **Selected Macroeconomic Indicator**

Key Policy Rates	Rate (%)	Last Change	Real Rate (%)	Trade & Commodities	20-Sep	-1 mth	Chg (%)	
US	5.00	Jul-23	2.50	Baltic Dry Index	1,977.0	1,735.0	13.9	
UK	5.00	Aug-23	2.80 S&P GSCI Index		533.4	534.3	-0.2	
EU	3.65	Jul-23	1.45	Oil (Brent, \$/brl)	74.5	77.2	-3.5	
Japan	-0.10	Jan-16	-3.10	Coal (\$/MT)	139.0	150.8	-7.8	
China (lending)	2.30	Aug-23	3.75	Gas (\$/MMBtu)	2.20	2.18	0.9	
Korea	3.50	Jan-23	1.50	Gold (\$/oz.)	2,621.9	2,514.0	4.3	
India	6.50	Feb-23	2.85	Copper (\$/MT)	9,346.5	9,085.8	2.9	
Indonesia	6.00	Sep-24	3.88	Nickel (\$/MT)	16,274.4	16,786.5	-3.1	
Money Mkt Rates	20-Sep	-1 mth	Chg	CPO (\$/MT)	958.5	890.5	7.6	
Pioney Pikt Rates	20-3ер	-1 111(11	(bps)	Rubber (\$/kg)	1.99	1.77	12.4	
SPN (3M)	6.06	6.45	-38.6	External Sector	Aug	Jul	Chg (%)	
SUN (10Y)	6.42	6.62	-19.8	External Sector	Aug			
INDONIA (O/N, Rp)	6.18	6.39	-20.4	Export (\$ bn)	23.56	22.24	5.97	
JIBOR 1M (Rp)	6.66	6.90	-24.4	Import (\$ bn)	20.67	21.74	-4.93	
Bank Rates (Rp)	Jul	Jun	Chg (bps)	Trade bal. (\$ bn)  Central bank reserves	2.90	0.50	478.90	
Lending (WC)	8.81	8.82	-1.72	(\$ bn)*	150.2	145.4	3.32	
Deposit 1M	4.78	4.70	7.49					
Savings	0.65	0.67	-1.66	Prompt Indicators	Aug	Jul	Jun	
Currency/USD	20-Sep	-1 mth	Chg (%)	Consumer confidence index (CCI)	124.4	123.4	123.3	
UK Pound	0.751	0.767	2.20	Car sales (%YoY)	-14.2	-7.8	-9.7	
Euro	0.896	0.898	0.29					
Japanese Yen	143.9	145.3	0.98	Motorcycle sales	7.4	24.1	3.5	
Chinese RMB	7.047	7.129	1.17	(%YoY)	/	27.1	5.5	
Indonesia Rupiah	15,150	15,435	1.88			Jul	Chg	
Capital Mkt	20-Sep	-1 mth	Chg (%)	Manufacturing PMI	Aug		(bps)	
JCI	7,743.0	7,534.0	2.77	USA	47.9	49.6	-170	
DJIA	42,063.4	40,835.0	3.01	Eurozone	45.8	45.8	0	
FTSE	8,230.0	8,273.3	-0.52	Japan	49.8	49.1	70	
Nikkei 225	37,723.9	38,062.9	-0.89	China	50.4	49.8	60	
Hang Seng	18,258.6	17,511.1	4.27	Korea	51.9	51.4	50	
Foreign portfolio ownership (Rp Tn)	Aug	Jul	Chg (Rp Tn)	Indonesia	48.9	49.3	-40	
Stock	3,322.0	3,322.0	0.00					
Govt. Bond	852.3	813.1	39.24					
Corp. Bond	7.0	7.6	-0.62					

Source: Bloomberg, BI, BPS

Notes:

<sup>\*</sup>Data from an earlier period

<sup>\*\*</sup>For changes in currency:  $\mathbf{Black}$  indicates appreciation against USD,  $\mathbf{Red}$  otherwise

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>For PMI, >50 indicates economic expansion, <50 otherwis

## **Indonesia - Economic Indicators Projection**

	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024E
Gross Domestic Product (% YoY)	5.0	-2.1	3.7	5.3	5.0	5.0
GDP per Capita (US\$)	4175	3912	4350	4784	4920	5149
Consumer Price Index Inflation (% YoY)	2.7	1.7	1.9	5.5	2.6	2.6
BI 7-day Repo Rate (%)	5.00	3.75	3.50	5.50	6.00	5.50
USD/IDR Exchange Rate (end of the year)**	13,866	14,050	14,262	15,568	15,397	15,650
Trade Balance (US\$ billion)	-3.2	21.7	35.3	54.5	37.0	32.6
Current Account Balance (% GDP)	-2.7	-0.4	0.3	1.0	-0.1	-0.5

<sup>\*</sup>Estimated number

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<sup>\*\*</sup> Estimation of the Rupiah's fundamental exchange rate